THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF

1996: A CASE OF REGULATORY
OBSOLESCENCE?*
Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy**

Thank you very much for the nice introduction. I am always happy to return
to my alma mater, and I am particularly honored to be the keynote speaker today at this terrific event. I know our audience will be treated to an extremely
informative program.
I was fortunate to be able to participate in last year's symposium, at which
my remarks focused on the convergence of formerly distinct regulatory silos
and the resultant challenges facing the FCC. This theme remains just as critical today, as the FCC continues to grapple with a host of issues that fall under
the convergence rubric. And it ties in well with this symposium's focus on
legislative reform. To my mind, the regulatory debates being waged at the
FCC and the ongoing legislative reform efforts center on the same fundamental
question, namely: In a world where multiple competitors offer bundles of IPenabled services over broadband platforms - including voice, video, and data
services - what is the appropriate regulatory framework? Should we continue
to apply traditional common carrier principles at the federal and state level to
wireline telecom carriers and perhaps extend such requirements to other net.
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work owners, such as cable operators, wireless broadband providers, and BPL
system operators? Or should policymakers phase out these traditional forms of
regulation and adopt instead a far more streamlined regulatory framework that
concentrates on core social policy obligations? I have consistently argued that
the latter approach is more rational, better for the industry, and, most importantly, better for consumers. And I have tried to ensure that the FCC is moving
in this direction in its proceedings on broadband networks, IP-enabled services,
broadband Internet access services, and related matters. So as the legislative
reform effort heats up, I hope that Congress will adhere to a similar policy
blueprint when it considers new legislation.
Before describing that blueprint in more detail, I thought it would be helpful
if I reviewed some of the key FCC proceedings that have taken place in recent
years, and then try to extract some lessons that can be applied in the legislative
context. For the FCC's successes and failures tell us a lot about what regulators can achieve and what is better left to the marketplace.
Successes and Failures in the Regulatory Arena
Let me begin with some regulatory success stories that we should try to
emulate. The shining beacon for me always has been the FCC's treatment of
commercial wireless services and, more recently, wireless broadband services.
I have often spoken about the wisdom of the Commission's lightly regulated
model for wireless services. In the early 1990s, when PCS services were introduced, the FCC was at a critical juncture. Some argued that the entrenchment of cellular incumbents called for a heavy-handed regulatory approach
characterized by controls on pricing and service quality. Instead, the FCC
adopted a narrower approach focused on the prevention of interference, and it
generally let go of the regulatory reins. Congress provided critical assistance
by enacting section 332 of the Communications Act, which preempted state
regulation of rate and entry regulation, thereby paving the way for nationwide
service plans. These policy choices unquestionably put us on the right path.
There is no doubt in my mind that we would not have seen the robust price
competition and high degree of innovation we enjoy today if not for Congress's preemption of traditional state utility regulations and the FCC's decision to refrain from imposing heavy-handed common carrier regulations on
PCS services.
Recently, the Commission has built on this success by allocating additional
spectrum, increasing flexibility, and continuing to avoid excessive regulation.
Last June, we provided increased flexibility in the MMDS and ITFS bands to
create the possibility of innovative new uses, including commercial broadband
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services. Moreover, in cooperation with NTIA, the Commission allocated new
spectrum for 3G services, and we also issued licensing and service rules. I am
also optimistic that the FCC's efforts to develop more effective secondary
markets for spectrum will enable more consumers to reap the benefits of
broadband technology. And there is no doubt that the Commission's allocation
of unlicensed spectrum also has helped promote broadband services. Many of
us have become quite familiar with the 2.4 GHz unlicensed band, as this spectrum has enabled an explosion of Wi-Fi "hot spots" in homes, offices, coffee
shops, hotels, and many other settings. The FCC recently allocated additional
unlicensed spectrum at 5.8 Gigahertz for Wi-Fi. Thus far, Wi-Fi systems tend
to complement, rather than compete with, last-mile technologies. But the development of several new standards, including Wi-Max - as well as the
Commission's recent NPRM concerning the potential for unlicensed devices to
operate on a non-interfering basis in the broadcast television spectrum - could
dramatically extend the range and robustness of wireless broadband services
and provide another last mile to the home.
I also believe that the Commission's approach toward Internet-based services and other information services have been a triumph for consumers.
While the Commission always regulated the common carrier facilities that underlie information services, it adopted a deliberate policy of non-regulation
regarding the information services themselves. The Computer Inquiry proceeding clearly set us on the right course by fencing off information services
from regulation. The result is a vibrant, innovative marketplace that is highly
competitive. The Commission's order last year regarding Pulver.com's peerto-peer Voice-over-IP service is faithful to this model. Because Pulver does
not provide the underlying telecommunications functionality or even make use
of the PSTN, the Commission correctly concluded that there was no reason for
federal or state authorities to regulate its VOIP service. I am also encouraged
that the Commission's NPRM on IP-enabled services signaled an intention to
preserve the environment of minimal regulation that has allowed information
services to flourish.
A third model of successful regulation involves the Commission's decision
to refrain from subjecting broadband network facilities to the sharing obligations known as "unbundling" requirements. In the TriennialReview Order and
a series of follow-on decisions, the Commission made clear that nextgeneration fiber networks would not be subject to unbundling obligations at
TELRIC rates, and thereby removed a significant impediment to investment by
both incumbent LECs and competitors.
Based on discussions with carriers and equipment manufacturers, it appears
that the Commission's deregulatory action is already bearing fruit. Verizon
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and SBC announced plans to invest billions of dollars in new fiber-to-the-home
and other deep-fiber architectures that will support very-high-speed Internet
access services as well as competitive video programming services. Smaller
carriers also have stepped up plans to deploy fiber deeper into the network.
This increased investment has brought new life to the equipment vendors and
should spark a revitalization of research and development activity. Unfortunately, the loss of jobs and R&D cutbacks cannot be reversed overnight - we
still have a ways to go to recover from the economic downturn of the last several years. But I am confident that eliminating the specter of burdensome unbundling obligations will have a very positive impact on broadband deployment, which in turn will speed the adoption of faster and more exciting consumer applications.
The common thread in these success stories is that, where there was competition, the Commission trusted the market to deliver benefits to consumers.
Wherever calls for heavy-handed regulation have been beaten back - in the
wireless sector, in the information services marketplace, and in the broadband
arena - consumers have enjoyed a high degree of innovation, good service
quality, generally declining prices, and a choice of providers. Of course, I recognize that it is not always possible or desirable to eliminate regulation altogether. For example, as I'll discuss in more detail in a few minutes, the Communications Act establishes core social policy goals that are not market driven
and require direct regulatory intervention. And some bottlenecks may exist in
some instances that prevent markets from developing in the first place. But my
philosophy has always been that where the structural impediments to competition have been removed and there is no reason to conclude that competition
will not develop organically, we should be steadfast in our search for ways to
minimize the regulatory overhang. Otherwise, we risk the perils of overregulation, which can be quite profound despite our best intentions.
Obviously, not everyone agrees that economic regulations should be minimized where competition exists. There is a little voice in the back of our heads
that says, despite how competitive a market is; I'm sure I can make it better.
One cautionary example is the effort in many states to regulate wireless services. While such actions are well-intentioned, I cannot quite figure out what
it is that they are trying to fix, and why they think regulators will be able to
drive better service quality and prices. There are several wireless providers in
most markets throughout the country, and these carriers have powerful economic incentives to provide the best possible service to their customers. They
compete not only on price, but also on service quality. Especially following
the FCC's introduction of wireless local number portability, customers have
the ultimate response to inadequate service: they can switch to another pro-
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vider.
And while I'm the first to admit that no service is perfect, even where competition is cut-throat, additional regulation can't change the laws of physics or
eliminate zoning restrictions. It is simply a fact of life that signal strength will
vary from place to place, and some calls will occasionally be dropped.
Tempted as we may be to try and make things even better, it is unlikely that
additional regulations will improve wireless service quality or the manner in
which the carriers treat their customers. But it is likely to add costs and result
in unintended consequences, and consumers will ultimately pick up the tab.
Regulations concerning contractual terms, billing practices, service quality,
and the like force carriers to develop new systems and safeguards and inevitably engender litigation. Such costs divert capital away from investment in new
cell towers and other more productive uses. In short, if ever we were to trust in
markets and let go of the regulatory reins, the wireless arena is the place to do
so. I sincerely hope that states will pay heed to this principle.
Until the FCC took action in the Vonage Order last year, a related concern
arose from the efforts of several states to impose traditional utility regulations
on Voice-over-IP services. As with wireless services, there is no dominant
provider of IP voice services, and the absence of a monopoly together with the
very low entry barriers makes it hard to understand the justification for seeking
to regulate these services. There is of course a legitimate governmental interest in ensuring that consumers have access to 911 services and that other core
social policy goals are achieved, but some states seemed interested in moving
far beyond these issues. Especially given that the FCC has a rulemaking proceeding pending, a wiser course of action is to show restraint with respect to
these nascent services. If providers are forced to deal with a patchwork of disparate state rules, many providers may be unable to survive, and costs to consumers will rise. That would be a terrible result, because IP services hold such
great promise for consumers. I believe that the inherently interstate nature of
IP services warrants a federal regulatory regime and that regime should rely to
the greatest extent possible on market forces rather than on prescriptive mandates.
A Blueprint for the Future
As we look back at past successes and failures, what lessons should we draw
- both for the FCC's continuing regulatory proceedings, and for the legislative reform process? It seems clear that when the Commission applied a light
regulatory touch and found the courage to resist calls to micromanage the marketplace, competition has thrived, innovation has flourished, and consumers
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have been the beneficiaries. By contrast, overregulation in the wireline arena
has drawn all providers' - incumbents and competitors alike - into a downward economic spiral and litigation that has benefited only lawyers. And state
forays into regulating wireless services and IP services threaten to diminish
consumer welfare in those arenas.
Hopefully, we will move beyond the contentious battles that have plagued
the industry over the last several years, and we will develop a greater consensus on the appropriate regulatory approach for the digital age. Many people
have called for a new regulatory model that does away with the old regulatory
silos for wireline, wireless, cable, and satellite services. I couldn't agree more.
The emergence of IP-based services promises to reduce the significance of
historical monopolies and erode the boundaries separating these legacy service
categories. I believe we are finally witnessing the convergence that many have
anticipated for years. Cable operators are ramping up VOIP offerings over
their broadband facilities, wireline carriers are deploying fiber optic networks
capable of supporting high-speed data and video services, wireless and satellite
broadband options are multiplying, and other providers using other platforms
are joining the mix.
In this environment, I believe it is essential for policymakers to let go of
dated notions of dominant providers and public-utility regulations - since
competition is a given in the converged broadband marketplace, the justifications for many forms of economic regulation are rapidly becoming obsolete.
I have spoken previously about what I call the Nascent Services Doctrine,
which posits that we should apply a heavy presumption against extending legacy rules to new services and technologies such as Voice over IP. Rather, we
should foster the development of such services in a minimally regulated environment to promote facilities-based competition and other important goals.
Eventually, leveling the playing field is necessary, but we should strive to do
so by relaxing the legacy rules applied to incumbent providers - in other
words, the existence of multiple facilities-based providers should enable us to
"regulate down" rather than "regulating up."
When I developed the Nascent Services Doctrine, I also made clear that I
was not advocating complete freedom from regulation. Indeed, there are certain core social policy goals that are not market-driven and probably cannot be
achieved without governmental urging, and perhaps mandates. I have been
very pleased to see in the developing record of the Commission's rulemaking
on IP-enabled services that almost all parties support policies that would ensure access to 911 services, access for persons with disabilities, compliance
with law enforcement surveillance requests, and the preservation of universal
service.
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And I think it is important to recognize that network owners and other providers of IP telephony services that are a substitute for traditional voice services should not only bear these responsibilities, and should also be granted
certain basic rights. Such rights would include the ability to interconnect with
other network owners on a peering basis and the right to obtain telephone
numbers. This notion of adopting basic rights and responsibilities - but
avoiding traditional economic regulations - is consistent with my call for the
regulatory equivalent of strict scrutiny in this arena. What I mean by strict
scrutiny is that we should adopt rules only where necessary to promote compelling governmental interests, and we should ensure that any rules we do
adopt are narrowly tailored to the interests at stake. Again, we have to ask
ourselves repeatedly, what's broken that we are trying to fix?
These principles, besides being relevant to FCC rulemakings, also would
provide a sound basis for a rewrite of the Telecom Act. The FCC must proceed as if legislation is not forthcoming, because it may take years before a
consensus emerges. But there may well be limits to what we can achieve
without legislative change. The NPRM on IP-enabled services appropriately
states that our regulatory framework should be guided by the functional nature
of particular services, rather than the regulatory classification as a "telecommunications service" or "information service." But those statutory labels carry
a great deal of weight and also present significant limitations. For example, if
the Commission classifies a service as an information service, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the extent to which we can use our Title I ancillary
authority to establish the sorts of social policy obligations we all deem to be
critical. Conversely, if the Commission classifies a service as a telecommunications service, that label carries a lot of baggage. The Act authorizes the
Commission to forbear from unnecessary regulations, but it likely would be
difficult and burdensome for the Commission to develop the appropriate record
to make the requisite findings to support forbearance from vast swaths of Title
I. Moreover, the most significant risk of all is that the courts of appeals may
reject the Commission's attempts to apply the statutory service classifications,
notwithstanding the deference we are supposed to receive. This is what happened in the BrandX case, because the court considered itself bound by a prior
panel decision. That case and the prospect of others introduce uncertainty that
inevitably chills investment to some degree.
So it is plain to me that the industry would benefit greatly from updated legislation. And I believe that such legislation should harmonize the disparate
treatment of network owners that traditionally fell within different silos - as
illustrated by the significant differences between the treatment of cable modem
services and DSL services. If Congress were to define the core rights and re-
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sponsibilities of network owners in a more neutral fashion, it would likely be
possible to do away with most legacy utility regulations at the federal level.
Specifying a need to comply with social obligations such as E91 1, law enforcement access, access for persons with disabilities, and universal service
will be sufficient for most technological platforms. Wireline networks likely
will require some additional regulatory scrutiny, given the thicket of common
carrier regulations and the dangers associated with a flash cut away from
wholesale regulations, such as unbundling obligations and the oversight over
interstate access services. But even in the wireline arena, I believe significant
streamlining is appropriate, and a more streamlined regulatory environment
would, in my opinion, usher in an era of increased investment and innovation.
In addition, industry participants and regulators both would benefit if Congress were to address the role of the states in the converged broadband marketplace. I don't think there is any question that states should continue to apply
generally applicable consumer protection requirements, such as laws prohibiting deceptive trade practices and certain telemarketing practices. I also believe
that states have an important role to play in conferring with federal authorities
regarding the development of federal regulatory requirements, as we do
through Federal-State Joint Boards, Joint Conferences, NARUC meetings, and
in other fora. But it has become a significant matter of debate whether states
should be permitted to impose economic regulations where the intrastate component of a service cannot practically be severed from its interstate or global
components. This concern formed the basis for Congress's preemption of state
entry and rate regulation of wireless services, and it also motivated the FCC's
preemption of state utility regulations in the Vonage Order. But the Vonage
Order is subject to appeal, and in any case it did not purport to be the final
word on the role of state public utility commissions in the newly converged
marketplace. So many of the debates pending at the FCC center on jurisdictional matters - these include the fate of state do-not-call lists, the FCC's ability to adopt comprehensive intercarrier compensation reform, and many other
issues. So I hope that, as Congress considers reform proposals, it gives serious
thought to clarifying the role for state regulators in the age of convergence.
Congress is best positioned to address this issue in a broad and authoritative
manner.
Finally, while policymakers need to rethink the substantive responsibilities
undertaken by the regulator, the FCC in the future also will need to rethink its
functions by reorienting itself from a rulemaking body to one focused on enforcement and consumer education. The movement away from economic
regulation undoubtedly will translate into a substantial reduction in rulemaking
activity. But with fewer prescriptive rules, there is a heightened need for strin-

20051

Keynote Address

gent enforcement of the core mandates. This will produce a better, leaner
model as the FCC focuses on the policies that are the most important and ensures strict compliance with them. In addition, I have spoken previously about
the need for the FCC to continue to improve its consumer outreach and education efforts. Competition delivers tremendous benefits, but it also can confuse
consumers as they are faced with unprecedented choices. The FCC plays a
vital role in informing consumers of their rights and opportunities so that they
can better navigate the competitive marketplace. To borrow from a discount
clothing chain, an educated consumer is our best customer.
In closing, I am truly excited by the limitless promise of broadband communications networks and the IP services they support. When we look back at
what has succeeded in promoting investment and innovation, it is clear that
regulatory restraint is an essential ingredient. It is no accident that our most
problematic and sluggish sector is also our most heavily regulated. I hope that
the FCC, our colleagues in the states, and Congress all heed these lessons and
work together to create an appropriate model for the future of communications.
Thank you for allowing me to share my thoughts with you today.

